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Most analysts believe that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—for all their ter-
rible effects on coastal communities in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas and
Alabama—will have no major lasting impact on overall U.S. economic activ-
ity. In its September policy statement, the Federal Reserve System’s Federal
Open Market Committee, while acknowledging Katrina’s possible near-term
adverse effect on spending, production and employment, argued that hurri-
cane-related disruptions and uncertainties “do not pose a more persistent
threat.”
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The labor force participation rate—the share
of the adult population that is working or looking
for work—has been declining in the United States
in recent years.
1 The downward trend has gener-
ated concern among some economists and policy-
makers. The economy grows by adding workers or
increasing productivity (or both). Barring other
changes, a decline in the share of the population
that is economically active translates into a lower
rate of economic growth.
2
Another worry is whether more-vulnerable
groups are participating disproportionately in the
decline. For middle- and high-income families, less
attachment to the labor force may simply reflect a
change in priorities or increasing wealth and may
not have adverse consequences. For low-income
families, on the other hand, dropping out of the
labor force can bring about financial distress,
lower future earnings and a greater dependence
on welfare programs.This article presents recession prob-
abilities calculated from two different
economic forecasting models and uses
them to get a sense of the economy’s
pre- and poststorm strength. The models
are very different. The first relies exclu-
sively on the slope of the Treasury yield
curve (the difference between the yields
on long- and short-term Treasury securi-
ties). The second relies on a new mea-
sure of oil-supply shocks and on finan-
cial indicators other than the yield curve.
Both models suggest that the likelihood
of continued positive real output growth
was high pre-Katrina and that it remains
high today.
The Yield Curve and the
Probability of Recession
The Yield Curve. The Treasury yield
curve shows how the yield on Treasury
securities varies with time to maturity.
Chart 1, for example, shows yield curves
for May 2004, just before the Federal
Reserve began raising short-term interest
rates, and for August and October 2005.
With long-term interest rates drifting
generally lower and short-term rates up
300 basis points, the yield curve has flat-
tened sharply over the current policy-
tightening cycle. This flattening is a
source of concern because there is evi-
dence the yield curve has forecasting
power for real economic growth and
because an inverted yield curve—which
occurs when short-term interest rates
exceed long-term rates—has proven to
be a reliable recession indicator.
1 (See
the box titled “The Yield Curve as an
Economic Indicator.”)
The 10-year minus one-year spread,
for example, has turned negative prior to
each of the past eight recessions, while
giving only one false signal (Chart 2). As
of August 2005, the spread was 39 basis
points—less than one-third its average
value for the past 25 years (127 basis
points) and less than half its average
value for the past 50 years (82 basis
points). In October 2005, the spread nar-
rowed further, to 28 basis points.
The Neftçi Method. We have seen
that an inverted yield curve has often—
but not always—signaled that an eco-
nomic recession is imminent. Salih Neftçi
developed a procedure that can be used
to attach a numerical value to the prob-
ability of an upcoming recession, based 
on the yield curve’s behavior.
2 To begin,
we construct a leading-indicator series
that is the cumulative sum of 10-year
minus one-year yield-curve spreads. This
series obviously increases when the
yield spread is positive and decreases
when it is negative.
3 To say the yield
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The Yield Curve as an
Economic Indicator
It is generally accepted that at horizons of
more than a few years, monetary policy pri-
marily influences the rate of inflation and not
the course of the real economy. A corollary is
that monetary policy affects the 10-year Trea-
sury bond yield mainly through expected infla-
tion. The real yield on 10-year bonds—the
market yield less expected inflation—varies
mostly for nonmonetary reasons (such as
changes in long-term productivity trends).
However, financial frictions imply that
monetary policy actions can have a temporary
impact on short-term real interest rates and,
through that channel, influence real economic
activity at short horizons. A policy that drives
short-term real rates down relative to the 10-
year real rate encourages current investment
and consumer-durables spending, stimulating
real activity. Conversely, a policy that drives
short-term interest rates up relative to 10-year
real rates discourages current spending and
restrains real activity.
Surveys of professional forecasters sug-
gest that long-term and short-term inflation
expectations have tended to move together
over the past 20 years…. Consequently,…the
slope of the market yield curve…has been a
reliable indicator of the difference between real
long-term and short-term interest rates and, by
the arguments given above, has also been a
good guide to the stance of monetary policy
and a useful indicator of the economy’s future
strength.
1
1 Excerpted from “Monetary Policy Prospects,” by Evan F.
Koenig, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic and
Financial Policy Review, vol. 3, no. 2, 2004, www.dallasfe-
dreview.org. See also “Predicting Real Growth and Inflation
with the Yield Spread,” by Sharon Kozicki, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Fourth Quarter
1997, pp. 39–57; “Understanding the Term Structure of
Interest Rates,” by William Poole, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Review, September/October 2005, pp. 589–95;
and “Why Does the Yield Curve Predict Output and Infla-
tion?” by Arturo Estrella, Economic Journal, vol. 115, July
2005, pp. 722–44.curve has inverted prior to every reces-
sion is equivalent to saying that our indi-
cator series has turned down before
every recession.
Next, we identify cyclical phases in
the indicator series. These are the
upswings and downswings that corre-
spond to, but generally precede, expan-
sions and contractions in the overall
economy, as identified by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Finally, for each month we calculate the
probability that the leading indicator
series is in cyclical decline, signaling a
future recession.
To start the process, the probability
of recession is set equal to zero when
the economy is at a cyclical trough. In
each subsequent month, the recession
probability is revised upward or down-
ward (using a statistical formula called
Bayes’ rule), depending on how likely it
is that the latest yield spread comes from
a cyclical down phase. The key point is
that knowing the current yield spread is
not enough to determine the probability
of recession. A low yield spread that is
just the most recent of a series of low
spreads sends a stronger recession signal
than the same low yield spread preceded
by a series of high spreads.
Based on our estimates, the proba-
bility of recession obtained by applying
the Neftçi method to the yield curve rises 
sharply roughly one year before the
onset of NBER contractions. As of August
2005, prior to Katrina, the probability of
a recession was only 1.2 percent, so a
recession anytime before third quarter
2006 appeared unlikely. October saw a
modest further narrowing of the yield
spread, raising the probability of reces-
sion to 2.4 percent (Chart 3).
An Alternative Approach
The Model. As an alternative to
assessing the economic outlook by
applying the Neftçi method to the yield
spread, we regressed average GDP
growth over the next two quarters on a
variety of financial indicators and a mea-
sure of oil-supply shocks, and calculated
the implied probability that growth
would turn negative. The chief advan-
tage of the alternative approach is that it
allows us to bring to bear a wider range
of potentially relevant information. An
important disadvantage is that we run
the risk of overfitting to recent experi-
ence.
4
We forecast two-quarter GDP growth
rather than one- or four-quarter growth
because over the past 50 years there is a
one-to-one correspondence between
NBER recessions and episodes in which
two-quarter GDP growth dips below
zero. This correspondence allows us to
interpret our negative-growth probabilities
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Yield Spread Turns Negative Before Recessions
(10-year Treasury yield minus 1-year Treasury yield)
Percentage points
Chart 2
NOTE: Shaded bars denote recessions.
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is imminent.as recession probabilities similar to those
derived using the Neftçi formula.
On the right side of our equation we
include the following: (1) the 12-month
change in the Standard & Poor’s 500
index, divided by nominal GDP; (2) the
three-month change in the junk-bond
spread (Merrill Lynch high-yield bond
index less Moody’s AAA corporate bond
yield); (3) the three-month change in the
real Treasury bill rate (the three-month
Treasury bill yield less one-year inflation
expectations from a survey of profes-
sional forecasters); and (4) an oil-supply-
shock variable. We tried including
lagged values of GDP growth, the slope
of the yield curve and the unemploy-
ment rate in the equation, but none of
these variables proved to add forecasting
power, so all were dropped from the
analysis. The estimation period starts in
first quarter 1986 and includes two
episodes of negative two-quarter annual-
ized GDP growth (corresponding to
recessions) and two additional episodes





and contributes to households’ purchas-
ing power. Movements in the junk-bond
spread reflect changes in the financial
stress felt by marginal corporate borrow-
ers.
6 Changes in real short-term interest
rates help capture changes in monetary
policy. One would expect future GDP
growth to be positively related to stock-
price appreciation and negatively related
to increases in the junk-bond spread and
real three-month Treasury-bill yield.
Such is indeed the case in our estima-
tions. (See the box titled “Forecasting
GDP Growth.”)
There is no consensus on how best
to measure oil-price shocks. There is,
however, substantial agreement that oil-
price increases have a bigger impact on
the economy than oil-price decreases
and a suspicion that price increases
caused by supply disruptions have a big-
ger impact than those caused by
increases in oil demand.
7 In an effort to
isolate price changes caused by adverse
shifts in supply, the oil-shock variable
used here discounts oil-price increases
to the extent they are accompanied by
increases in U.S. oil consumption. The
idea is that shifts in oil demand tend to 
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Despite Narrowing Yield Spread, Recession Probability Remains Low
(Neftçi formula applied to 10-year minus 1-year spread)
Probability (percent)
Chart 3
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Forecasting GDP Growth
We have three forecasting equations for real GDP growth: one based on financial data for the first
month of the quarter, one based on second-month data and one based on third-month data. Financial-indi-
cator coefficients are restricted to be equal across all three equations—a restriction not rejected by the data.
Similarly, the total oil-shock effect—but not its timing—is restricted to be the same across equations. Coef-
ficient estimates reported in the table below are obtained using the full sample period, which runs from first
quarter 1986 through second quarter 2005. (However, the probabilities displayed in Chart 5 are based on
recursive estimates.)
Coefficient Estimates* 
Indicator (lag)  Coefficient  Standard error t statistic
Constant 3.535 .141 25.076
ΔStock prices (–2) 25.487 7.136 3.571
ΔReal short rate (–2) –.551 .209 –2.635
ΔJunk-bond spread (–2) –.715 .131 –5.436
First month :
Oil Shock (–3)  –.008 .004  –2.026
Oil Shock (–4) –.019  .004  –4.584
Second month:
Oil Shock (–3) –.011  .004  –2.979
Oil Shock (–4) –.015  —  —
Third month:
Oil Shock (–3)  –.015  .004  –3.771
Oil Shock (–4)  –.012 — —
Summary Statistics
First month: Adj. R
2 = 0.630 SE = 0.988 SSR = 64.474
Second month:  Adj. R
2 = 0.638 SE = 0.978 SSR = 62.193
Third month:  Adj. R
2 = 0.618 SE = 1.004 SSR = 65.516
* Dummy variables are used to effectively exclude fourth quarter 1990 through second quarter 1991 and third quarter 2001 through first 
quarter 2002 from the sample. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the 9/11 terrorist attacks had an unforeseeable adverse effect on growth 
during these periods. Precise definitions of the indicator variables are in the main text. cause price and quantity to move in the
same direction, while shifts in supply
cause price and quantity to move in
opposite directions. To capture the
asymmetry in the economy’s response to
oil-supply shocks, only positive values of
the resultant series are considered.
8
Chart 4 compares our oil-shock vari-
able to a plot of oil-price increases unad-
justed for changes in oil consumption.
The two series are scaled so their respec-
tive means line up with one another.
Note how our adjustment enhances the
relative size of the 1990 oil-price spike
while shrinking the 1987, 1999–2000,
2002–03 and 2004 increases, attributing
them partly to increases in U.S. oil
demand. In a head-to-head horse race,
our oil-shock variable has predictive
power for GDP growth, while the unad-
justed price-increase series does not.
9
The Results. In Chart 5, green bars
show periods during which actual two-
quarter GDP growth fell below 1 percent
(light green) or below 0 percent (dark
green). Colored lines, meanwhile, show
our forecasting model’s assessment of
the probability that GDP growth over the
next two quarters would fall below 1
percent (the blue line) or below 0 per-
cent (the red line). Since there is a one-
to-one correspondence between NBER
recessions and episodes of negative two-
quarter GDP growth, the red line can
also be thought of as our model’s esti-
mate of the probability of a recession. As
of August 2005, the recession probability
was only 2.8 percent—well below the
levels reached in December 2000 (15.5
percent), July 2002 (16.4 percent) and
June 2005 (6.9 percent). A significant
“growth recession” was somewhat more
likely, with a 15.6 percent probability of
GDP growth below 1 percent as of
August 2005—down from 23.3 percent
in June. Using October data, the proba-
bilities of an outright recession and a
growth recession are only 3.8 percent
and 21.3 percent, respectively.
Discussion. Although Charts 3 and 5
are currently telling similar stories about
the probability of recession, this clearly
has not always been the case. In 2000,
for example, Chart 3 shows recession
chances soaring to near certainty. Chart
5 suggests that the economy was in a
weakened condition, vulnerable to an
adverse shock, but that outright recession
was far from inevitable. (The economy
was equally vulnerable in 2002, accord-
ing to the chart, but experienced only a
period of sluggish growth.)
The differences between the charts
reflect differences between the underly-
ing models. The yield-curve model
behind Chart 3 treats recessions as dis-
tinct from expansions, with distinct
dynamics. Recessions are triggered by
the cumulative effects of financial-mar-
ket imbalances, signaled by a short-term
interest rate that is too high for too long 
relative to the level of long-term rates.
Once these cumulative effects reach a
critical level, an economic downturn is
all but inevitable. One can question the
reliability of the signal and, more deeply,
the whole notion of an economic tipping
point.
In the forecasting model underlying
Chart 5, in contrast, a recession is just a
period of unusually slow growth; noth-
ing otherwise distinguishes it from a
period of economic expansion. Given
this assumption, other variables dominate
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Forecasting Model Says Recession and
Slow-Growth Risks Both Low
Probability (percent)
Chart 5
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Probability of growth less than or equal to zero
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120is 3.08 percent per year, with a standard deviation of 1.63 percentage
points.
6“The Information in the High-Yield Bond Spread for the Business Cycle:
Evidence and Some Implications,” by M. Gertler and C. S. Lown,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 15, Autumn 1999, pp.
132–50.
7 “Business Cycles and Energy Prices,” by Stephen P. A. Brown, Mine
K. Yücel and John Thompson, in Encyclopedia of Energy, vol. 1, Cut-
ler J. Cleveland, ed., Elsevier-Academic Press, 2004, and “What Is an
Oil Shock?” by J. D. Hamilton, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 113,
issue 2, 2003, pp. 363–98.
8 Formally, the oil-shock variable is SHOCK(t) = max{0, ΔP(t) – 17.5
× ΔQ(t)}, where ΔP(t) is the four-quarter percentage change in the
real price of oil less its sample average and where ΔQ(t) is the four-
quarter percentage change in total U.S. demand for petroleum prod-
ucts less its sample average. The appendix accompanying this article
on www.dallasfed.org gives details of the derivation.
9 We obtain similar results in a head-to-head comparison with an oil-
shock variable suggested by Hamilton (note 7), which counts only oil-
price increases that are not merely a reversal of recent price declines.
10 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the hurricanes will
knock between 0.17 and 0.26 percentage points off GDP in the second
half of 2005. Then, recovery efforts will boost first-half 2006 GDP by
between 0.19 and 0.28 percentage points, relative to baseline.
the current slope of the yield curve as
indicators of the economy’s future
strength. It is largely coincidence that
those other variables now tell much the
same story as the yield curve.
Cautious Optimism
Historical links between oil prices,
various financial indicators and the real
economy suggest that the probability of
a recession over the next several quar-
ters is low. Conclusions are basically the
same regardless of whether we look at
pre- or post-Hurricane  Katrina data. This
is not to say that Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita are unimportant to the economic
outlook. Much of the storms’ direct
adverse impact will be felt at a shorter
horizon than that at which our models
are designed to forecast.
10 In this sense,
the storms slip in under the radar screen
of our models. And there is no way we
can disentangle the storms’ effects from
the implications of other economic data
released in September.
In any event, the U.S. economy’s
dynamic nature makes it difficult to pre-
dict its future movements. Changes in
technology and in environmental and
other regulations constantly alter the
way energy prices impact the economy
and the way it adapts to shocks of all
kinds. The standard disclaimer, that past
performance is no guarantee of future
results, certainly applies. 
—Evan F. Koenig
Keith R. Phillips
Koenig is a senior economist and vice presi-
dent at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
and Phillips is a senior economist at the
Bank’s San Antonio Branch.
Notes
Thanks go to Harvey Rosenblum, Alan Viard and Steve Brown for help-
ful comments and Nicole Ball for research assistance.
1 For empirical evidence, see “Predicting U.S. Recessions: Financial
Variables as Leading Indicators,” by Arturo Estrella and Frederic S.
Mishkin, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 80, February 1998,
pp. 45–61.
2 “Optimal Prediction of Cyclical Downturns,” by Salih N. Neftçi, Jour-
nal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 4, November 1982, pp.
225–41.
3 Formally, LI(t) = LI(t – 1) + R10(t) – R1(t), where LI(t) is the value of
the leading index in period t and R10(t) and R1(t) are the 10- year and
one-year interest rates, respectively.
4 Estrella and Mishkin (note 1) question the reliability of multivariate
recession-forecasting models partly on these grounds.
5 The start date is driven partly by the limited availability of comparable 
junk-bond data. However, it offers several other advantages. First, it
excludes the pre-1984 period of highly volatile GDP growth, and so
avoids statistical problems associated with shifts in the variance of the
forecasting equation’s error term. Second, the sample period is domi-
nated by a single Federal Reserve chairman. This is important because
changes in how monetary policy is conducted can alter the empirical
links between financial variables and the real economy. Third, oil
prices and oil consumption exhibit increased high-frequency volatility
following the 1986 oil-price collapse. By excluding pre-1986 data, we
needn’t worry about modeling this break in behavior when we con-
struct our oil-shock variable. (See the appendix to this article on the
Dallas Fed’s web site, www.dallasfed.org.) Finally, the reductions in the
energy intensity of the U.S. economy that followed the big oil-price
hikes of the 1970s slowed after 1985. (See Alan Greenspan’s remarks
before the Japan Business Federation, Japan Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, and Japan Association of Corporate Executives, Tokyo,
Oct. 17, 2005, www.federalreserve.gov.) By starting our sample in
1986, we lessen concerns about a possible gradual weakening of the
links between oil prices and economic activity.
Over the sample, there is a total of three quarters during which
growth was negative and another eight quarters in which growth was
positive but below 1 percent. Over the full sample, then, growth was
negative 100 × 3/79 = 3.8 percent of the time and was below 1 percent
100 × 11/79 = 13.9 percent of the time. The average GDP growth rate 
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Cross-Border Shopping Activity
A One-Day Conference on the Border Retail Sector
Friday, January 13, 2006
Holiday Inn Select
77 N.E. Loop 410
San Antonio, Texas
Retailing to Mexican nationals is big business in south Texas.
The retail sector has provided many job opportunities to low-
and moderate-skill workers and has been an important reason
why job growth along the Texas–Mexico border has outper-
formed most areas of the country since the 1980s. Experts at
this conference will discuss the size, drivers and future of bor-
der retailing, especially in light of increasing globalization and
the threat of terrorism. 
Hosted by
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
San Antonio and El Paso Branches
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Detroit Branch
International Council of Shopping Centers
For more information or to register for this conference, visit our
web site at www.dallasfed.org and click on “Events.”